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Private Ordering and Commercial
Arbitration:
Lasting Lessons from Mentschikoff
Stephen J. Ware *

ABSTRACT:
“Private ordering” is an important concept and commonly-used
phrase in legal scholarship. At least three “ordering” activities often
performed by governments can be privatized: lawmaking, adjudication,
and enforcement of adjudicators’ decisions. Distinguishing among these
activities and offering lasting lessons on their privatization—but nowadays
not often credited for doing so—is Soia Mentschikoff’s seminal 1961
article, Commercial Arbitration. This short piece reconsiders
Mentschikoff’s classic article in light of contemporary scholarship on
private ordering and credits Commercial Arbitration with teaching us
lasting lessons about commercial arbitration and even about commerce
itself. Key to these lessons is Mentschikoff’s empirical study of trade
association arbitration and her comparison of such industry-specific
arbitration with the more general commercial arbitration exemplified by
the American Arbitration Association (AAA). This comparison shows
arbitration’s ability—especially in the “core commercial” context of trade
associations—to privatize all three of the aforementioned “ordering”
activities: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of adjudicators’
decisions. Mentschikoff thus builds impressively from the humble context
of routine sales disputes to enduring insights about the role of private
ordering in the production, application, and enforcement of law.

PRIVATE ORDERING AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LASTING LESSONS
FROM MENTSCHIKOFF
I.

Private Ordering
A. Privatizing Lawmaking, Adjudication, and Enforcement
B. Levels of Government Support for Private Ordering
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II. Mentschikoff’s Commercial Arbitration
A. Mentschikoff’s Data
B. A Classic Article’s Enduring Relevance
C. Goods, Cross-Border Transactions, and Arbitration
III. Private Ordering in Commercial Arbitration
IV. Conclusion
“Private ordering” is an important concept and commonly-used phrase in legal
scholarship. 1 While in this context “private” generally means non-governmental,
the type and degree of non-governmental ordering can vary widely. 2 For example,
different scholars have used “private ordering” to refer to things as varied as
contracts, 3 neighborly customs among California ranchers, 4 credit rating agencies, 5

1. A Feb. 14, 2018, search of “private ordering” in Westlaw’s JLR database revealed 6607 results.
5035 of these are dated 2000 or later, while only 1572 are before 2000.
2. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, Path Dependence in the Development of Private Ordering, 2014 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 29, 30 (2014) (using “private ordering” and “Private legal systems (PLSs)” interchangeably
and noting “PLSs range from informal institutions that bear little resemblance to the public legal system
(the law), such as norms of politeness, to ones that are very similar to the law, such as complex
commercial arbitration among diamond dealers.”).
3. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, New Frontiers in Private Ordering-An Introduction, 49 ARIZ. L. REV.
577, 577 (2007) (“Contract law itself is a mixture of the public and the private, a means by which the
state supports private ordering with remedies for breach of some promises.”); Howell E. Jackson,
Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploration Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
319, 341–43 (1999) (“Private ordering is, of course, our presumptive (but not exclusive) regulatory
regime in the field of contracts. In the classic two-party contract setting, we generally allow parties to
allocate risks as they choose.”).
4. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129,
163–67 (2013) (“the private ordering analyzed by Ostrom, Ellickson, and others . . . tends to occur
through informal interactions among individuals . . . [such as] the norms that drive the behavior of
lobstermen in Maine or farmers and cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California”); Barak D. Richman,
Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 746 (2012) (citing Robert C.
Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 3-4 (1991) (“Shasta County Neighbors,
it turns out, do not behave as Coase portrays them as behaving in the Farmer-Rancher Parable. Neighbors
in fact are strongly inclined to cooperate, but they achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from
legally established entitlements, as the parable supposes, but rather by developing and enforcing adaptive
norms of neighborliness that trump formal legal entitlements.”)). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase
and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986)
(studying effects of a 1945 statute granting County Board of Supervisors authority to determine when
cattle owners were liable for cattle trespass. Through interviewing 28 ranchers in 1982, Ellickson
determined that the 1945 change in animal trespass law failed to affect the farmers’ resource allocation
towards improving boundary fences because high transaction costs, namely having to learn and enforce
legal rules, prevented litigation. Even though cattle trespass was common, cattle owners chose not to
rely on law, but instead on “norms of neighborliness” to settle disputes.); id. at 678 (“Although the killing
of trespassing livestock is a crime in California, six landowners--not noticeably less civilized than the
others--unhesitatingly volunteered that they had issued death threats of this sort. These threats are
credible in Shasta County, because victims of recurring trespasses, particularly if they have first issued
a warning, feel justified in killing or injuring the mischievous animals.”).
5. Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Private and Public Ordering in Safe Asset Markets, 10 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 97, 104 (2015).
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Underwriters Laboratories, 6 the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations, 7 and the Mafia. 8
More conceptually, at least three “ordering” activities often performed by
governments can be privatized: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of
adjudicators’ decisions. Distinguishing among these activities and offering lasting
lessons on their privatization—but nowadays not often credited for doing so—is
Soia Mentschikoff’s seminal 1961 article, Commercial Arbitration. 9 This short
piece reconsiders Mentschikoff’s classic article in light of contemporary
scholarship on private ordering, and credits Commercial Arbitration with teaching
us lasting lessons about commercial arbitration and even about commerce itself.
Key to these lessons is Mentschikoff’s empirical study of trade association
arbitration and her comparison of such industry-specific arbitration, with the more
general commercial arbitration exemplified by the American Arbitration
Association (AAA). This comparison shows arbitration’s ability—especially in the
“core commercial” context of trade associations—to privatize all three of the
aforementioned “ordering” activities: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of
adjudicators’ decisions. Mentschikoff thus builds impressively from the humble
context of routine sales disputes to enduring insights about the role of private
ordering in the production, application, and enforcement of law.

I. PRIVATE ORDERING
A.

Privatizing Lawmaking, Adjudication, and Enforcement

Governments make law, and “[a]lmost all theorizing about law begins with
government.” 10 A simple civics lesson might describe the roles of the three
branches of government as making law (legislature), enforcing law (executive), and

6. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 321-22 (2002).
7. Id. See also About The Joint Commission, THE JOINT COMM’N, https://www.jointcommission
.org/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx (last updated Oct. 23, 2018) (commission
provides accreditation and certification to health care organizations that meet certain performance
standards).
8. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2457–58 (2000) (“Some private-order organizations use threats of physical
violence. The Sicilian and Russian Mafias, for example, offer contract-supporting services, but a lot else
besides. Organized crime, according to Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, ‘is the dark side of private
ordering - an entrepreneurial response to inefficiencies in the property rights and enforcement framework
supplied by the state.’”) (quoting Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private
Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43
(2000)); Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of
Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2335–36 (2004) (describing as a “system[] of private
enforcement” “aris[ing] where . . . state-sponsored contract enforcement is unavailable” “members of
mafia or other criminal networks whose transactions involve illegal activity”).
9. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).
10. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Privatizing Law: Is Rule of Law an
Equilibrium Without Private Ordering?, SSRN (Oct. 23, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057093
(“Almost all theorizing about law begins with government.” The conventional view is that “law is the
subset of norms that are created and enforced by governments. Positive political theory takes the idea
that law is the province of government for granted and focuses on the processes and principles by which
the substance of law is determined.”).
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adjudicating disputes by applying law (judicial). 11 While no branch of government
sticks to a single role, 12 the three roles of making, enforcing, and adjudicating law
adequately describe the basics of government. This sequence of governmental
activity—making, enforcing, adjudicating—is often chronological in criminal
prosecutions and other cases brought by government because, in such cases,
lawmaking precedes governmental enforcement (arrest, indictment, or suit), which
precedes adjudication. 13 In contrast, when the plaintiff is a private party,
government’s adjudication usually precedes its enforcement because in civil
litigation due process typically entitles the defendant to notice and an opportunity
to be heard before any governmental enforcement against that defendant. 14

11. See, e.g., VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223, 235 (Kan. 1973) (“Generally speaking, the
legislative power is the power to make, amend, or repeal laws; the executive power is the power to
enforce the laws, and the judicial power is the power to interpret and apply the laws in actual
controversies.”).
12. For example, both executive agencies and common law courts make law and legislative “Article
I courts” adjudicate.
13. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3-103 (1975) (“All violations of the criminal laws may . . . be
prosecuted upon the filing of an information . . . ‘Information’ means a written statement by a district
attorney general charging a person with the commission of a criminal offense.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 3534-1-1 (LexisNexis 1982) (“All prosecutions of crimes shall be brought in the name of the state of
Indiana. Any crime may be charged by indictment or information . . . Except as provided . . . all
prosecutions of crimes shall be instituted by the filing of an information or indictment by the prosecuting
attorney, in a court with jurisdiction over the crime charged.”); Charging, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/charging (last visited Feb. 11, 2018) (“After the prosecutor
studies the information from investigators and the information he gathers from talking with the
individuals involved, he decides whether to present the case to the grand jury. When a person is indicted,
he is given formal notice that it is believed that he committed a crime. The indictment contains the basic
information that informs the person of the charges against him.”); Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence
After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2394 (2011) (“Administrative agencies, it is widely remarked,
possess and combine the powers of lawmaking, enforcement, and adjudication. It would be hard to resist
(or to improve on) Professor Gary Lawson’s compact statement of how the Federal Trade Commission
combines these functions: The Commission promulgates substantive rules of conduct. The Commission
then considers whether to authorize investigations into whether the Commission’s rules have been
violated. If the Commission authorizes an investigation, the investigation is conducted by the
Commission, which reports its findings to the Commission. If the Commission thinks the Commission’s
findings warrant an enforcement action, the Commission issues a complaint. The Commission’s
complaint that a Commission rule has been violated is then prosecuted by the Commission and
adjudicated by the Commission. This Commission adjudication can either take place before the full
Commission or before a semi-autonomous administrative law judge. If the Commission chooses to
adjudicate before an administrative law judge and the decision is adverse to the Commission, the
Commission can appeal to the Commission.”).
14. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 8 (1991) (“[D]ispensing with notice and opportunity for a
hearing until after the attachment, without a showing of extraordinary circumstances, violates the
requirements of due process”); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The Government may not deprive a person of one
of these protected interests without providing ‘notice and an opportunity to respond,’ or, in other words,
the opportunity to present reasons not to proceed with the deprivation and have them considered.”); 10
WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, DEBTOR & CREDITOR NON-BANKRUPTCY § 9:2 (4th ed.) (under Supreme Court
decisions, “the defendant must receive notice of the request for a prejudgment remedy and an
opportunity for a hearing either before seizure of property or (under certain circumstances) promptly
thereafter.”); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8
(2006) (“Briefly stated, the essential element of procedural due process, as clearly established in civil
settings, is that notice and a hearing must ordinarily precede any governmental deprivation of a liberty
or property interest.”); Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances Gecker, Due Process and Bankruptcy: A
Contradiction in Terms?, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 54, 60 (1993) (stating that “[t]he cornerstones of
procedural due process are ‘notice’ and a ‘hearing.’ . . . As a general rule, individuals are constitutionally
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Consequently, this paper on private ordering (not government’s prosecutions or
suits) discusses lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement in that sequence.
Lawmaking is routinely privatized by contracts, trusts, wills, and similar
documents that enable private parties to choose their legally-enforceable rights and
duties. 15 But government courts nevertheless adjudicate and enforce those
privately-created duties, so the “private ordering” of contracts, trusts, wills, and the
like does not necessarily privatize the activities of adjudicating legal claims or
enforcing the adjudicators’ decisions. 16
Adjudication can be privatized through arbitration, which typically privatizes
both selection of the adjudicator (an arbitrator hired by the parties rather than a
judge hired by government) and the procedures of adjudication (such as the AAA’s
Commercial Arbitration Rules, rather than the federal or state rules of civil
procedure and evidence). 17 However, while arbitration privatizes adjudication, it
does not necessarily privatize lawmaking or the enforcement of adjudicators’
decisions. That is because the claim in an arbitrated case may arise under law (such
as a statute or regulation) made entirely by government, 18 and the arbitrator’s
decision may be confirmed by a government court and then enforced by a
government sheriff or marshal. 19
Private ordering can even extend to law enforcement, which in this context (as
noted above 20) means remedying breaches of duties found in civil, as opposed to
criminal, law. Examples of private law enforcement are many. For instance,
breaches of contract are often met with private sanctions like refusing to do
additional business with the breaching party or lowering a defaulting debtor’s credit
score or bond rating with a credit bureau or ratings agency. 21 In those examples,
entitled to prior notice of a hearing” and “[t]here must be a method whereby one can defend rights or
interests that another is trying to take away; this concern is satisfied with the opportunity to be heard.”).
15. Brian H. Bix, The Public and Private Ordering of Marriage, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 308
(2004) (“The general argument for making enforceable the private ordering of marriage and marriagelike relationships reflects the general ideals underlying other forms of private ordering (e.g., contracts,
trusts, property, and wills): that it better serves both private and public interests to allow parties to order
their lives as it suits them.”).
16. See Aviram, supra note 2 (citing Braucher, supra note 3 and Jackson, supra note 3).
17. “[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected
[disputing] party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned
arguments for a decision in his favor.” Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 364 (1978); see also 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT § 2.6.1, at 2:37 n.1 (1994) (“Arbitration is a form of adjudication because the parties
participate in the decisional process by presenting evidence and reasoned arguments to an arbitrator
whose final decision should be responsive to the dispute as presented.”).
18. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration,
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1031, 1038 (2009) (international “arbitrators ordinarily rely on national law and
not the [privately-created customary] lex mercatoria in resolving disputes”).
19. See STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA R. LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW § 39 (2017)
(discussing confirmation and enforcement of arbitral awards). To the extent government enforces
arbitration awards that depart from government-created law, then arbitration might well privatize
lawmaking; but law on when courts should enforce or vacate such awards is deeply unsettled. Stephen
J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 56, 106 (2014)
(Supreme Court has yet to “resolve the fundamental question whether arbitration awards must apply the
law correctly to avoid vacatur”).
20. See supra notes 13-14 (and accompanying text).
21. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support
Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 1000 (2016) (surveying businesses
and finding that “contract breach is penalized by the loss of a valuable relationship or reputational harm”
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while enforcement of the legal duty may be entirely privatized, a government court
may adjudicate the claim for breach of that duty. 22

B. Levels of Government Support for Private Ordering
All the private ordering discussed above is to some extent supported by
government, which enacts laws designed to facilitate: (1) private lawmaking
through contracts, trusts, and wills; 23 (2) private adjudication through arbitration; 24
and (3) private law enforcement through credit bureaus and ratings agencies. 25 In
contrast, other private ordering is actively opposed by government. For example,
government actively opposes criminal enterprises such as the Mafia, and such
enterprises engage in private ordering insofar as they: (1) enact rules of “law,” such

rather than by litigation); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction
of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1392
(2010) (“One type of informal enforcement is the threat that one party to an informal contract will
respond to its counterparty’s breach by reducing or terminating future dealings.”); David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 394-95 (1990) (“often-cited
data that merchants rarely sued when sales contracts were breached suggest that those contracts were
primarily enforced through nonlegal sanctions. On this interpretation of the data, the legally enforceable
contract formally stated the parties’ obligations, but nonlegal pressures - particularly concern with
business reputation - actually induced compliance.”); id. at n.70 (“[M]anufacturers often extend credit
to consumers even though high litigation costs and judgment-proof defaulters may make it impractical
to obtain recovery through legal remedies. The incentive for consumers to repay is largely reputational:
consumers want to maintain a good credit rating.”); Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 326-27 (describing credit
ratings agencies, as “private companies, such as Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services and Moody’s
Investors Service,” as a type of private ordering).
22. Braucher, supra note 3, at 577 (“Contract law itself is a mixture of the public and the private, a
means by which the state supports private ordering with remedies for breach of some promises.”). For
instance, a lender might sue and win a quick default judgment against its borrower but then incur only
the low cost of reporting the judgment to credit bureaus but not the higher costs of pursuing government’s
judgment-enforcement (such as through garnishment or writs to a sheriff).
23. See Jackson, supra note 3; Bix, supra note 15, at 304 (“Another sense of private ordering involves
having the power to order one’s life by being able to enter binding agreements for the future distribution
of property (for example, through wills). This form of private ordering requires a government (or social
institution or other social force) willing and able to enforce the commitments entered into.”); David V.
Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 373–77 (2003) (“[M]ost privately made law depends
ultimately on the power of the state—power the state lends, dependably and in generous measure . . .
[and] in various commercial contexts, as a practical matter, the lawmaking function has been partially
reallocated from the government.”).
24. Barak Richman lists as a private ordering activity within the “shadow of the law”: “the growing
and elaborate world of arbitration.” Richman, supra note 4, at 744–45.
25. FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970); Scott Shorr, Personal
Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1756, 1784-89 (1995) (“FCRA permits credit bureaus and their customers to exchange large
quantities of detailed consumer information with impunity [and] . . . gives credit bureaus considerable
freedom to resort to intrusive collection methods.”).
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as, do not snitch to the police; 26 (2) adjudicate alleged violations of these rules; 27
and (3) enforce violations of these rules. 28
In between private ordering supported by government and private ordering
opposed by government is private ordering which receives neither significant
government support nor significant government opposition, but rather government
neutrality. The classic example of such private ordering is trade association
arbitration. It typically privatizes:
• lawmaking, because trade association “arbitrators commonly apply
codified industry trade rules rather than publicly created rules,” 29 and these
trade rules often differ from the government law that would otherwise
apply; 30
26. Adam Harris Kurland, The Prosecution of Michael Vick: Of Dogfighting, Depravity, Dual
Sovereignty, and “A Clockwork Orange”, 21 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 465, 513 n.168 (2011) (quoting
LETIZIA PAOLI, MAFIA BROTHERHOODS: ORGANIZED CRIME, ITALIAN STYLE 109 (2003)) (“‘omerta’ is
described as popular southern Italian code of silence that implies ‘the categorical prohibition of
cooperation with state authorities’.”).
27. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and Motive to
Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 258 n.95 (1998) (citing United States
v. Gotti, 171 F.R.D. 19, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (According to the Mafia’s loyalty oath, “death is assured
for the person who is or is suspected of becoming a rat.”)).
28. Id. See also Richman, supra note 4, at 748 (“the mafia and other criminal networks resort to selfenforcement because their illegal transactions are unenforceable in state-sponsored courts”).
29. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1035–36; see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1772-73 (1996)
(National Grain and Feed Association (“NGFA”) has privatized lawmaking by “adopt[ing] four sets of
substantive trade rules that . . . cover the basics of contract formation, performance, repudiation, breach,
damages, and excuse” as well as issues related to barge transportation.); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (“[D]iamond industry disputes are
resolved not through the courts and not by the application of legal rules announced and enforced by the
state. The diamond industry has systematically rejected state-created law. In its place, the sophisticated
traders who dominate the industry have developed an elaborate, internal set of rules, complete with
distinctive institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes among industry members.”). See Yuliya
Chernykh, The Last Citadel: The Restricted Role of Lawyers in Soft Commodity Arbitration,
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2017), https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?
key=2453 (soft commodities arbitration, such as that administered by the Grain and Feed Trade
Association and the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations, “shows that non-legal adjudicators
with good knowledge of trade usages and customs are preferable to legal adjudicators who are not
particularly familiar with them. This preference is confirmed by a number of examples, ranging from
direct confirmation from major traders and the impressive proportion of trade that is conducted under
the associations’ standard contract forms to such indirect illustrations as the growing numbers of trade
association members; the numerous amendments to arbitration rules and other regulations, guidelines
and policy which have not excluded the qualification requirements for arbitrators; a constant preference
for not listing arbitrators who are actively involved in legal practice, and the lack of other fora competing
with bespoke commodity arbitration, etc.”).
30. For instance, Bernstein notes that “industry-drafted trade rules do not, for the most part, include
the types of standard-like words, such as ‘reasonable,’ ‘seasonable,’ and ‘without objection in the trade,’
that permeate the [Uniform Commercial] Code. Rather, they contain primarily clear, bright-line rules.”
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 29, at 1732-33. “Another notable
difference between the trade rules and the Code is the absence of a trade rule equivalent of the Code’s
nonwaivable duty of good faith.” Id. at 1734; see also Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court,
supra note 29, at 1775 (National Grain and Feed Association “trade rules do not contain an explicit
equivalent of the Code’s broad duty of good faith.”). In addition, “the types of damage measures
available in the private system differ in important ways from the measures used in the public system.”
Bernstein, Private Commerical Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 29, at 1733.
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adjudication, because in trade association arbitration “the decision maker
is a private party, not a state employee,” 31 and
• enforcement, because trade association “arbitration awards are typically
enforced through extralegal sanctions, such as publicity or threat of
expulsion from the trade association. Only rarely do parties go to court to
enforce awards in trade association arbitrations.” 32
Soia Mentschikoff, as explained below, showed all this with the publication of
Commercial Arbitration in 1961. 33 Trade association arbitration then apparently
faded from the interest of legal scholars until the 1990’s and 2000’s, when Lisa
Bernstein published a series of detailed and widely-cited studies of trade association
arbitration. 34 Academic interest in “private ordering” more generally seems also to
have increased in recent decades. 35
Some of this recent literature contrasts trade association arbitration with other
arbitration to compare different types of private ordering. 36 For instance,
Christopher Drahozal persuasively contrasts trade association arbitration—which
often privatizes all three of lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of law—with
international commercial arbitration, which privatizes only adjudication because
international commercial arbitration tends to apply national law, rather than
privately-created rules, 37 and because its awards are often enforced by national
courts rather than privately. 38 So, Drahozal writes, international commercial
arbitration is not “a purely private legal system,” 39 but rather a “hybrid case” serving
primarily as a “procedural substitute for national courts.” 40 Similarly, Barak
Richman emphasizes that trade association arbitration, exemplifying “private legal
systems rely[ing] on private sanctions and private enforcement,” is very different
from other arbitration, which “takes place within the shadow of the law” because
its awards are enforced by government. 41
•

31. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1035. See also Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra
note 29, at 1772 (NGFA has privatized adjudication because “[a]s a condition of membership in the
Association, members must agree to submit all disputes with other members to the Association’s
arbitration system.”).
32. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1036. See also Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra
note 29, at 1772 (NGFA has privatized enforcement of adjudicator’s decisions because “[a] member who
refuses to submit to arbitration or fails to comply with an arbitration award rendered against him may,
in addition to having his actions reported in the NGFA newsletter, be suspended or expelled from the
Association.”).
33. See infra Section II.
34. See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 29. THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Lisa Bernstein,
The NGFA Arbitration System at Work (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.ngfa.org/pdfs/NGFA
ARBITRATIONSTUDY.pdf; Richman, supra note 4, at 741 (“Among the most important strands of
scholarship on extralegal enforcement have been inquiries, most famously by Professor Lisa Bernstein,
into comprehensive private arbitration systems, or private legal systems.”).
35. See supra note 1.
36. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1032–33; Richman, supra note 4, at 753–57.
37. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 1038–40.
38. Id. at 1035-36.
39. Id. at 1049.
40. Id.
41. Richman, supra note 4, at 757; id. at 759–60 (“Private legal systems, however, are distinct from
typical arbitration precisely because they rest atop private enforcement mechanisms--and, in fact, they
tend to prohibit their members from seeking relief from state-sponsored courts, as victors in arbitration
are able to do.”).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2019/iss1/5

8

Ware: Private Ordering and Commercial Arbitration: Lasting Lessons from

No. 1]

Lasting Lessons from Mentschikoff

9

These contemporary scholars—Bernstein, Drahozal, and Richman—follow
and deepen Mentschikoff’s path, as she long ago published a detailed study of trade
association arbitration and contrasted such arbitration with other arbitration, thus
illuminating different types of private ordering.

II. MENTSCHIKOFF’S COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. Mentschikoff’s Data
The previous section summarized some significant contemporary legal
scholarship on private ordering. While that literature grows increasingly
sophisticated, many of its important lessons appeared in Mentschikoff’s 1961 article
Commercial Arbitration. The following pages reconsider this classic article and
show how very much Mentschikoff taught us.
Commercial Arbitration is an empirical article, as it reports the results of
Mentschikoff’s survey of trade associations. While Commercial Arbitration does
not tout this survey, in fact first mentioning it as a passing reference while
discussing something else, 42 this survey provides the basis for the article’s many
important contributions.
Mentschikoff’s survey of these trade associations “received 547 relevant
responses.” 43 At the broadest level, 34% of the associations “indicated that their
members made individual arrangements for arbitration,” while 29% “indicated that
they used some type of organized machinery, including the American Arbitration
Association,” and 26% “reported that their members never arbitrate.” 44
Mentschikoff’s analysis of this data yields Commercial Arbitration’s key insight:
“These differential responses from trade associations as to the utilization of
arbitration was not on a random basis, but indicated instead that there were rational
reasons for the existence of these differences.” 45 Mentschikoff’s empirical data on
the prevalence of arbitration distinguishes among the types of goods involved; and
she classifies parties according to their roles in the production and distribution of
goods, with particular emphasis on “merchants,” which she defines as “persons
primarily buying for resale.” 46 Mentschikoff made three findings:
(1) Where members of a trade association buy primarily for resale, the rate of
institutionalized arbitration machinery is higher than in associations without these
types of merchants. 47
(2) Associations dealing in foreign trade, especially importers, were more
likely to use an institutionalized arbitration system. 48

42. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 846. Nine years earlier, Mentschikoff published an article stating
an intent to generate empirical data on arbitration. See Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of
Arbitration—A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 699 (1952) (“The University of
Chicago Law School is now considering a project which would at least by sample tend to give the
answers, but that cannot be completed for at least three years.”).
43. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 849.
44. Id. at 849.
45. Id. at 849-50.
46. Id. at 850.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 850-51.
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(3) Raw/fungible goods associations are more likely to develop an
institutionalized arbitration system than hard/finished goods like cars or
appliances. 49
Mentschikoff further adds that when all three factors—merchants (buy for
resale), international trade, and raw goods—are present the rate of institutionalized
arbitration approaches 100%. 50 Implications of these findings are discussed in the
following sections.

B. A Classic Article’s Enduring Relevance
Mentschikoff’s survey teaches us lasting lessons about commercial arbitration,
and even about commerce itself. Among these lessons are connections between
goods and commerce, and thus between goods and commercial arbitration. For
example, as Christopher Drahozal and I wrote (citing Commercial Arbitration),
“Going back to Soia Mentschikoff’s pioneering research, the commercial
arbitration literature has focused on sales of goods as the leading place to find
arbitration clauses between businesses.” 51 Drahozal and I wrote this while
cautioning against reading data collected by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey
Miller to suggest that “given their choice, most businesses that negotiate contracts
would prefer a judicial dispute resolution system over arbitration.” 52 While
Eisenberg and Miller saw a “surprisingly low frequency of arbitration clauses” in
the contracts they studied, 53 Drahozal and I drew on Mentschikoff’s Commercial
Arbitration to write:
Not only do Eisenberg and Miller focus on types of contracts that are
unlikely to include arbitration clauses, they either do not consider, or pay
little heed to, the types of contracts that the arbitration literature commonly
identifies as likely to include arbitration clauses. As a result, their study
likely significantly understates the use of arbitration clauses in contracts
between sophisticated parties.
First, going back to Soia Mentschikoff’s pioneering research, the
commercial arbitration literature has focused on sales of goods as the
49. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 851-52.
50. Id. at 852 (“To the extent that the factors leading to institutionalized machinery reinforce each
other, as, for example, in the case of an association reporting that its members have an import relationship
to foreign trade, deal in raws, and consist of merchants, the existence of arbitration machinery rises to
approximately 100 per cent.”).
51. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration
Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 463 (2010).
52. Id. at 434 (quoting William J. Woodward Jr., Saving the Hague Choice of Court Convention, 29
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 657, 669 (2008)).
53. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 51, at 434 (quoting Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The
Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (2007)). Eisenberg and Miller concluded: “Little
evidence was found to support the proposition that these [sophisticated] parties routinely regard
arbitration clauses as efficient or otherwise desirable contract terms.” Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts
of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (2007). Instead, they “interpret [their]
findings as evidence that sophisticated actors prefer litigation to arbitration, encounter obstacles to
negotiating mutually satisfactory contract terms that include arbitration clauses, or some combination of
these factors.” Id. at 336.
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leading place to find arbitration clauses between businesses. This focus on
goods continues in Lisa Bernstein’s widely-cited studies of trade
association arbitration. Bernstein documents the prevalence of arbitration
in contracts for the sale of goods in industries as diverse as cotton,
diamonds, grain, and textiles. Moreover, sale-of-goods disputes rank
highly in the caseloads of international arbitration institutions. Yet none of
these goods contracts is, as far we can tell, in Eisenberg and Miller’s data
set. 54
In short, sale-of-goods disputes have long been the core of “commercial
arbitration,” and one of Commercial Arbitration’s strengths is its emphasis on
goods, as distinguished from land, services, credit, intellectual property, or
information. An important connection between goods and arbitration—cross-border
transactions—is discussed next.

C. Goods, Cross-Border Transactions, and Arbitration
While the word “commercial” is sometimes used to describe any activity with
a business or income-producing purpose (as distinguished from a personal, family,
household, religious, cultural, social, political, or governmental purpose), 55
transactions in goods differ from other business transactions because goods, as
tangible movables, differ from both land—which is tangible, but immoveable—and
intangibles like services, credit, intellectual property, and information. Such
differences cause transactions in goods to raise legal issues not raised by other
business transactions. 56 For example, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2—which

54. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 51, at 463-64.
55. For example, the phrase “commercial real estate” is widely used in contrast to “residential real
estate.” See, e.g., DAVID GELTNERER & NORM G. MILLER, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS AND
INVESTMENTS (2d. ed. 2007) (“Mortgagebacked securities (MBS) are publicly traded bondlike products
that are based on underlying pools of mortgages, which are real-estate-based debt products. There are
both residential MBSs and commercial MBSs.”); Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay
Conveyancers-Empirical Evidence Says “Cease Fire!”, 31 CONN. L. REV. 423, 491 (1999) (“The
preceding regulatory agencies ultimately were unable to distinguish in their databases between
complaints filed in residential real estate transactions and those filed in commercial real estate
transactions.”). Similarly, “commercial speech” is widely used in contrast to “political speech” or
“artistic speech.” Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the
Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093,
1108 (1991) (“[R]ather than regarding commercial speech as simply less valued than political speech,
the Relational Framework employs less content-specific factors to distinguish between categories of
speech.”); Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities Regulation, 58
S.C. L. REV. 789, 807 n.117 (2007) (“The rationale for the supposed constitutionality of such government
restraint turns on notions of the difference between commercial speech and political or artistic speech or
on some notions of regulation of professionals in the securities industry.”).
56. Fiona Smith & Lorna Woods, A Distinction Without a Difference: Exploring the Boundary
Between Goods and Services in the World Trade Organization and the European Union, 12 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 1, 3 (2005) (“In many legal systems distinctions are made between ‘goods’ and ‘services’ with
different regimes applying to each of them. Although in some instances goods and services may be
subject to similar rules despite these distinct regimes, in other cases they may be accorded different
treatment. Indeed, it may be that, given their inherent characteristics, goods and services should be
treated differently.”); see also Walter White, Difference Between Goods and Services: Visual Guide,
INEVITABLE STEPS, https://inevitablesteps.com/marketing/difference-between-goods-and-services/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2018) (referring to seven major differences between goods and services: intangibility,
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governs sales of goods, but generally not sales of land, services, or intangibles—
has rules on risk of loss while goods are in possession of a carrier or other bailee, 57
as well as rules on the seller’s tender of goods and the buyer’s acceptance or
rejection of those goods. 58 None of these rules has a particularly close analog in
sales of land, services, or intangibles. 59
Moreover, cross-border transactions in goods grew earlier in history, 60 and
(internationally, at least) remain larger than cross-border transactions in services, 61
so the case for uniform law across jurisdictions was stronger earlier with respect to
transactions in goods than transactions in land, which cannot move across borders,
ownership, perishability, evaluation, quality measurement, simultaneous production and consumption,
and punctuality).
57. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SALES LAW 287–316 (1st ed. 2009)
(describing U.C.C. sections 2-509 and 2-510 as governing risk of loss).
58. See id. at 292 (describing U.C.C. sections 2-503 and 2-504 as governing seller’s tender of goods);
id. at 481-95 (describing U.C.C. sections 2-601, 2-602, 2-612 as governing buyer’s rejection of goods);
id. at 474-81 (describing U.C.C. sections 2-606 and 2-607 as governing buyer’s acceptance of goods);
id. at 496-507 (describing U.C.C. sections 2-607, 2-608 as governing buyer’s right to revoke acceptance).
59. See DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (6th ed. 2016) (“In contrast to the sales of
goods system, there is a true functional significance to the moment of the ‘closing’ in real estate sales.
Following the closing, there is very little chance, absent some fundamental fraud or mistake in the
transaction, that the buyer would be able to reject or revoke acceptance of the real estate and rescind the
entire contract.”); 10 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES UCITA § 604:1 (NIMMER 2016) (referring to “a
fundamental difference between transactions in the area of sales of goods and transactions in reference
to information or information services. In the latter type of transaction, there are many situations in which
the Article 2 concept of tender, inspection and delivery of a copy are simply irrelevant. Instead, the
performance (e.g., grant or rights, completion of services, providing of access) in itself conveys to the
transferee all of the value that it contracted for.”). Risk of loss while goods are in possession of a carrier
or other bailee can have no close analog in transactions (land, services, intangibles) that have nothing
physically moved to possession of a carrier or bailee.
60. See, e.g., Bamber Gascoigne, History of Trade, HIST. WORLD, http://www.historyworld.
net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=gpy#1923 (last visited Sep. 26, 2017) (during the first
to fifth centuries AD, “[t]he caravan routes of the Middle East and the shipping lanes of the
Mediterranean . . . provided the world’s oldest trading system, ferrying goods to and fro between
civilizations from India to Phoenicia.”); TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, in WORLD TRADE REPORT
2013 44, 54 (World Trade Organization, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr132b_e.pdf. (explaining that from 1918 to 1939, trade “was largely dominated by the exchange of raw
materials and agricultural products for manufactured goods . . . since 1945, the main component of trade
has been the international exchange of manufactured goods or the components of manufactured goods”).
In contrast, cross-border transactions in services are relatively recent. Raymond T. Nimmer, Services
Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 736 (1993)
(“Historically, services contracts involved intangible and nonstorable value. If I hire a company to repair
my office air conditioning system, the services it provides are rendered on site and cannot be stored for
later use. The service provider must be present . . . Many modern services contracts retain this
nonstorable and localized character. But prior to the information, communications and transportation
explosions of the past several decades, this was the only option for most commercial services.”). See
also Prakash Loungani, Saurabh Mishra, Chris Papageorgiou & Ke Wang, World Trade in Services:
Evidence from a New Dataset 16 (Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/17/77, 2017) (“[T]he
global economy . . . for so long depended on the stable engines of manufacturing production and exports
. . . The industrial revolution built the manufacturing process with the steam engine, division of labor,
electricity and mass manufactured production.”); id. at 3-4 (“Historically, buyers and sellers needed to
be face to face . . . Provision of services - such as restaurant meals, haircuts, and medical checkups required face-to-face transactions. These did not lend themselves easily to standardization and trade”).
61. WORLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2015 1, 14–15 (2015) (showing that in
2014 world merchandise (goods) exports totaled $19,002 while world exports of commercial services
totaled $4,782) (“Global services trade, as measured by balance-of payments statistics, represents only
about a fifth of total trade in goods and services combined.”); International Trade Statistics 2015,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its15_toc_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2018).
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or service transactions. 62 In fact, uniform law—both within the United States and
internationally—advanced earlier and farther with respect to transactions in goods
than in land or services. Domestically, uniform law on goods dates back at least to
the 1906 Uniform Sales Act 63 and has been carried forward with the Uniform
Commercial Code, which governs transactions in goods—including not only sales
and leases of goods, but also goods as collateral, and as the subject of documents of
title, 64—while transactions in land and most services remain largely subject to nonuniform state law. 65 Internationally, while the Convention on the International Sale
of Goods (governing contracts for the sale of goods) is ratified by eighty-seven
nations, 66 no analogous convention governs contracts for the international sale of
services. 67
62. However, at least one commercial law scholar thought uniformity in the law governing services
was worth pursuing as early as a quarter century ago. See Nimmer, supra note 60, at 729 (“It is time,
actually long past time, to include services contracts in the UCC.”). When original Article 2 was written,
most commercial services were provided locally. The world has changed. While many services are
provided on a local basis, vast amounts of commercial services are supplied by national companies or
by services vendors brought in from remote locations . . . [T]hrough information technology and
communications systems, vendors can work from remote locations. If desired, the services output can
usually be stored. Restraints in location and storability, like impediments on travel, no longer impede
national services networks . . . Services contracts today involve a mix of nationally sourced and local
transactions. In this respect, they resemble the mix found in transactions in goods. Id. at 736–37.
63. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the American Bar Association created the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to promote uniformity in law among the states.
Richard L. Savage III, Laying the Ghost of Reliance to Rest in Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: An “Endpoints” Analysis, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1065, 1068–69 (1993). In 1902, the
conference chose Professor Samuel Williston to lead a commercial acts project, eventually known as the
Uniform Sales Act. Id. at 1069. The Uniform Sales Act was patterned after the British Sale of Goods
Act of 1893 and in 1906 was promulgated for the states to adopt. See id.
64. U.C.C. Article 2-Sales (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); U.C.C. Article 2A-Leases
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); U.C.C. Article 7-Documents of Title (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); U.C.C. Article 9-Security Interests in Personal Property (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). Nimmer, supra note 60 (UCC’s scope “reflects a goods bias”).
65. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, 192 (8th ed. 2016) (“The UCC does not govern the rendering of services or the sale of land.
Contracts for selling services or land are governed by common law contracts principles…”); Nimmer,
supra note 60, at 732 (“Services contract law consists of often obscure common-law principles and stateby-state diversity.”); id. at 735 (“Consider what default rule governs whether delivery of a slightly
damaged product breaches a contract for the sale of a television, and contrast this with the default rule
that governs whether a brief delay in completing work breaches a consulting contract . . . For the
television, UCC Article 2 provides the reference point, and the general rule will be the same in most
states. The answer for the consulting contract lies in common-law rules. One might turn to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts for a general principle, but the Restatement principles have not been
adopted in all states; answers for particular states would depend on relevant case law . . . Both bodies of
law can be discovered and applied, but codified rules are more readily accessible and tend to be more
uniform across jurisdictions.”).
66. Internationally, the Convention on the International Sales of Goods was released in 1980 and has
87 ratifying parties and 18 signatories, while no comparable treaty governs transactions in land or a wide
array of services. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 11, 1980), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.a
spx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=en (status of CISG including dates, parties,
and signatories); Franco Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application and
Scholarly Writing, 15 J.L. & COM. 1, 65 n.432 (1995) (“The rationale behind the exclusion of the
international sale of immoveable property from the sphere of application of the CISG is the potential
refusal to ratify the CISG by most States which would not have accepted a uniform law derogating their
domestic law in a field controlled by public policy considerations.”).
67. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited With The Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION (Mar. 2, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/pages/Content.aspx?path=DB/MTDSGStatus/p
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The commonality of uniform law and arbitration is that they both facilitate
cross-border transactions, so uniform law and arbitration share a virtue more likely
relevant to a transaction in goods than in land or services. One of the advantages of
uniform law across jurisdictions is that it reduces disputes about which
jurisdiction’s law governs. 68 When law is non-uniform, each party to a dispute may
argue for its own jurisdiction’s law, which is presumably more familiar, and perhaps
more favorable, to that party. 69 So uniform law can relieve a party of the costs of
complying with the presumably less familiar and favorable law of the opposing
party’s jurisdiction.
Similarly, a neutral arbitral forum can relieve a party of the costs of litigating
in the courts of the opposing party’s jurisdiction. In addition to fear of a court’s
possible bias for its own fellow citizens litigating against foreigners, “the general
fear associated with litigating before a foreign court... includes lack of familiarity
with the foreign court’s system or procedure, pursuing the litigation away from
home and the difficulties of enforcement of a foreign judgment.” 70 These fears can
be avoided with a neutral arbitral forum. 71 So this advantage of arbitration, like the
ageIntro_en.xml (listing all multilateral treaties of the UN (including the CISG) none of which concern
international contracts in services or land); Maria del Pillar Perales Viscasillas, UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts: Sphere of Application and General Provisions, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L
& COMP. LAW 381, 385 (1996) (The CISG “is an international treaty which states may incorporate as
national law,” while the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts for international
service contracts are merely “a set of rules without binding character for either individuals or states.”).
Similarly, treaties regarding tariffs and other trade barriers have progressed farther with respect to goods
than services. The General Agreement on Trade in Services “is far less comprehensive and more
discretionary than” the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which governs goods. Andreas Lindner,
Bill Cave, Lydia Deloumeaux & Joscelyn Magdeleine, Trade in Goods and Services: Statistical Trends
and Measurement Challenges, 7 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. STAT. BRIEF No. 1, 2001,
https://www.oecd.org/trade/its/2539563.pdf.
68. Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 671, 671–72 (1999)
(“[U]niform rules [in international commercial law] promote efficiency. Diverse national laws create
legal costs of determining and complying with the laws of multiple jurisdictions. Ex post litigation costs
of forum shopping and deciding sometimes difficult choice of law issues are also produced.
Because uniform law subjects a transnational commercial transaction to a single set of rules,
it reduces the legal costs associated with the transaction.”).
69. See Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws,
34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 489 (2014) (“Lawyers are typically trained in the law of one legal system,
and thus admitted (and insured) to practice one law. If their client eventually decides to provide for
another law to govern her contract, only lawyers admitted to practice that other law will be able to advise
her with respect to the particular transaction. In most cases, this will mean that only those lawyers will
be able to make profit out of the relevant transaction. The result is that most lawyers have strong
incentives to see their client provide for the law in which they are trained.”). See also Gilles Cuniberti,
The Laws of Asian International Business Transactions, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 35, 61 (2016) (“Each
[party] knows the contract law of his particular jurisdiction but typically does not know the law of other
jurisdictions, including the law of the other party’s jurisdiction. Parties would, therefore, prefer to submit
their contract to their own law not only to avoid the additional costs associated with learning a foreign
law, but also because it is psychologically more comfortable to apply familiar law to their business
relationships.”).
70. Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration- Corporate Attitudes and Practices- 12 Perceptions
Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 525, 537-39 (2004).
71. See W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 2-3 (1995) (“In short, while speed, informality, and
economy have had some influence on the growth of international commercial arbitration, the essential
driving force has been the desire of each party to avoid having its case determined in a foreign judicial
forum. Parties seek to avoid these forums for fear that they will be at a disadvantage due to
unfamiliarity with the jurisdiction’s language and procedures, preferences of the judge, and possibly
even national bias.”).
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advantage of uniform law, is more significant with respect to transactions in goods,
which are more likely to be cross-border, than transactions in land or services.
Thus, we should not be surprised that Mentschikoff found that the organizations of
parties who most often deal in goods—trade associations comprised of merchants
and especially those whose business is international—created arbitration systems to
resolve disputes among their members. As noted above, Mentschikoff found
“institutionalized arbitration” more common among trade associations: (1)
comprised of merchants (those buying for resale), (2) associations engaged in
foreign trade, and (3) dealing in raw/fungible goods; and she found that when all
three factors—merchants (buy for resale), international trade, and raw goods—are
present, the rate of institutionalized arbitration approaches 100%. 72

III. PRIVATE ORDERING IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Mentschikoff uses her phrase “institutionalized arbitration” to include two
types of commercial arbitration: (1) arbitration administered by a trade association,
and (2) arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
Commercial Arbitration’s detailed study of these two types of arbitration reveals
their contrasts and thus illuminates different types of private ordering.
“Self-contained trade group arbitration is,” Mentschikoff concludes, “an
extremely important method of settling buyer-seller disputes.” 73 However, she
explains, lawyers are generally not involved in trade association arbitration, because
merchants play all the necessary roles. Lawyers typically neither represent the
parties in trade association arbitration nor serve as arbitrators. 74 Moreover, the
parties to trade association arbitration agreements rarely need litigation to enforce
such agreements or to confirm or vacate trade association arbitration awards.
Mentschikoff notes that merchant parties to trade association arbitration agreements
rarely need courts to enforce such arbitration agreements and awards because these
merchants are repeat players in the same industry and thus are vulnerable to nonlegal pressures—culminating in expulsion from the trade association—if they
challenge the arbitration agreement or award. 75
72. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 852.
73. Id. at 854.
74. Id. at 859 (“In almost all self-contained trade associations and exchanges, on the other hand,
lawyer participation in the arbitration proceedings is either forbidden or discouraged, and very few of
the arbitrators are lawyers or law-trained.”). This remains true in soft commodities arbitration (SCA)
such as that administered by the Grain and Feed Trade Association and the Federation of Oils, Seeds
and Fats Associations. See Chernykh, supra note 29 (“Limiting the role of lawyers is an important
common feature in SCA; lawyers are not usually included in the mandatory arbitral panel and cannot as
a rule represent parties in oral hearings without both parties’ express agreement, which in practice is
seldom given.”).
75. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 854 (“In exchange groups, not only is resort to arbitration on the
whole compulsory for members, but failure to abide by an award is frequently considered grounds for
disciplinary proceedings against the recalcitrant party.”). See also Mentschikoff, supra note 42, at 703–
04 (“The point to be made in favor of arbitration is that typically such legal testing or appeal is not
indulged in by the parties. There are non-legal pressures to accept the process and the award . . . In the
labor field . . . [t]he economic sanction of strike or lockout is always present to enforce good faith action
under an arbitration clause. In the commercial field . . . [i]t may be that the third attribute of arbitration
with all that it connotes for the criteria of decision is enough to swing the balance in favor of arbitration:
A judge whom you can choose for yourself”); Charny, supra note 21, at 409 (“[I]n a well-organized
market with an institutional apparatus for dispute resolution, such as an arbitration system, nonlegal
sanctions are used to enforce compliance with the arbitrators’ decisions.”); id. at 400 (“A trade
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In contrast, Mentschikoff shows, the AAA’s general commercial arbitration—
often involving parties not in the same trade association—tends to be very
different. 76 This general commercial arbitration is much more like litigation, with
lawyers usually representing the parties and often serving as arbitrators. 77
Moreover, Mentschikoff emphasizes that central to the AAA’s mission is producing
arbitration awards courts will confirm rather than vacate. 78 She describes AAA
procedures including a clerk whose job is to draft the award and prevent the
arbitrators from writing a reasoned opinion, because the AAA believes a very short
award—with no reasoning that could tempt a court to find flaws—is less likely to
be vacated. 79 Relatedly, because the AAA is more concerned than trade
associations about how an arbitration’s process will appear to a reviewing court, the
AAA is more concerned about arbitration procedure, thus further “lawyer-izing”
AAA arbitration compared to trade association arbitration. 80
While AAA procedures have changed since Mentschikoff’s day, short awards
remain common in much domestic commercial arbitration, in part because the AAA
encourages them. 81 However, while short awards may deter vacatur, they lack the
association or industry arbitration system may also enforce standards by exacting penalties from
members, expelling noncompliant members, or certifying superior products with its ‘seal of approval.’”);
Richman, supra note 8, at 2339 (Since failure to comply with industry rules and arbitrators’ rulings
“precludes future business in the industry, losers of arbitration rulings will exhibit compliance only if
the benefits from their future dealings within the merchant community will outweigh their immediate
loss in arbitration.”); id. at 2340 (“A merchant who is found by a private court to have breached a contract
but fails to pay receives publicity as a bad actor, leading other merchants to respond to the public ruling
by refusing to deal with the transgressor. The literature is replete with instances of such coordinated and
collectively orchestrated punishments.”).
76. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 857–58.
77. Id. at 859 (“Lawyers represent one or more of the parties in 80 per cent of the cases, and serve as
arbitrators in about 30 per cent. The availability of legal norms or standards for utilization in the
disposition of particular arbitrations at the Association is therefore theoretically present.”).
78. Id. at 856 (The AAA “from its beginning held itself out as an expert in matters that went to the
enforceability of an award and set up its rules and regulations with the primary aim of rendering awards
that would not be set aside by the courts.”).
79. Id. at 865 (“After the hearings are declared closed, the arbitrators, possibly on the same day, meet
to reach a decision. Briefs are sometimes requested, but this is not the usual practice. The tribunal clerk,
who has sat through the hearings and who frequently is consulted by the arbitrators as to appropriate
procedure, sometimes sits with the arbitrators during deliberations, but more commonly, he is simply
available to answer questions. His major task at this point is to draft the award in a legally perfect manner
and to prevent the arbitrators from issuing an opinion.”); id. at 857 (“The Association puts enormous
pressure on its arbitrators not to write opinions but to merely state the award in dollar amounts.”).
80. Id. at 858 (“The third difference between self-contained trade association systems and the casual
arbitration at the Association lies in the methods by which awards are enforced. The ultimate sanction
in many of the self-contained associations and in almost all of the exchanges is a disciplinary proceeding
and thus, potential legal problems with respect to procedure are not seriously considered in these groups.
The ultimate sanction at the Association is the rendering of judgment on the award by a court of
competent jurisdiction, and therefore problems of procedure are always uppermost in the minds of the
tribunal clerks, who are charged with the duty of policing the arbitrators sufficiently, so that the award
rendered will be legally enforceable.”).
81. See Cynthia A. Murray, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 637-38 (2002) (“[M]ost awards
in domestic commercial arbitration do not specify the factual and/or legal grounds on which they are
based”); Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 449, 513 (2005) (“[A]n arbitrator’s freedom from the need to explain or justify his award is closely
linked to his lack of accountability in terms of judicial review: The naked award that is the norm in
domestic commercial arbitrations can be explained as much by a desire to insulate decisions from judicial
scrutiny as to any desire to avoid the delay or added expense that written opinions would entail.”);
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reasoning of a good precedent that can be relied upon in future cases. This fits
Mentschikoff’s observation that AAA arbitrators’ decisions are rarely used as
precedents while, in contrast, trade association arbitrators’ decisions often have
precedential value. 82 Trade associations, she writes, maintain continuity in their
arbitrators and circulate their opinions to members or allow for some form of
appeal. 83
Commercial Arbitration’s discussion of arbitration awards includes one of
Mentschikoff’s most cited passages, which is her finding that “[e]ighty percent of
the experimental arbitrators thought that they ought to reach their decisions within
the context of the principles of substantive rules of law, but almost 90 percent
believed that they were free to ignore these rules whenever they thought that more
just decisions would be reached by so doing.” 84 Mentschikoff’s finding that most
arbitrators feel free to ignore substantive rules of law highlights the degree to which
arbitration can privatize lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement.

IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Mentschikoff’s Commercial Arbitration continues to teach us about
commercial arbitration in ways that teach us also about commerce and about the
private production, application, and enforcement of law. She details a
thoroughgoing form of private ordering in trade association arbitration that
privatizes all three of:
(1) lawmaking (through arbitrators applying industry trade rules rather than
governmental law, and through the precedential effect of arbitrators’ reasoned
awards);
THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 626 (5th ed. 2016) (“Written opinions are a rarity, except in labor
arbitration, maritime and international arbitration. Indeed, the AAA urges arbitrators to avoid writing
opinions as a means to keep the arbitral participants form challenging awards.”); Abraham J. Gafni,
Written Opinions in Arbitration Aren’t a Given, LAW.COM (Sept. 22, 2008),
https://www.law.com/almID/1202424702244. (“[I]n the AAA Commercial Rules and the Uniform
Arbitration Act, there is a presumption that a reasoned opinion will not be issued unless the parties so
require”).
82. Mentschkoff, supra note 9, at 857 (“Arbitration at the Association differs substantially from
arbitration at the self-contained trade groups. The first and most significant difference between the two
systems lies in the use of precedent. The decisions that are rendered by the arbitration committees of
self-contained trade associations do have precedential value. This is achieved in two ways: in some
associations opinions are written and circulated to the membership; in others awards can be appealed or
referred to other committees for the establishment of general standards. Most important, however, in all
of these associations there is a continuity in the membership of the deciders, which means that the system
of precedent operates automatically, for a question decided in one case on the basis of consideration of
competing norms is unlikely to be decided differently in the next case by the same people. However, the
casual system of arbitration used by the American Arbitration Association, is designed to discourage the
use of precedent. The Association puts enormous pressure on its arbitrators not to write opinions but to
merely state the award in dollar amounts. It also tries very hard and very successfully not to have any
one person sit as an arbitrator more than once or twice a year.”).
83. Id. For more on the precedential value of arbitration awards, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier,
Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2012).
84. Mentschikoff, supra note 9, at 861. A separate question is how often arbitrators in fact ignore or
depart from the substantive law a court would have applied had the case been litigated. See Christopher
R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 194 (2006) (“‘[H]ow often’ do
arbitrators not follow the law? The empirical evidence on this point--which consists of case analyses,
surveys of arbitrators, and reversal rates of arbitration awards and court decisions-- is varied but
ultimately inconclusive.” (footnote omitted)).
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(2) adjudication (through arbitration procedures quite different from courts’
rules of procedure and evidence); and
(3) enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision (through private sanctions
culminating in expulsion from the association).
By contrast, she shows that the general commercial arbitration typical of the
AAA often includes only the second of these three forms of privatization.
Mentschikoff’s comparison of two types of commercial arbitration thus leads us
from the mundane context of ordinary sales disputes to fundamental questions about
the roles of private parties in the production, application, and enforcement of law.
In these important ways, she established both the path followed by significant
portions of today’s private ordering literature, exemplified by Drahozal and
Richman, 85 and the path of in-depth empirical study exemplified by Bernstein. 86 In
short, Commercial Arbitration’s relevance endures.

85. See Richman, supra note 4.
86. See Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 29.
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